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NO. 10 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
Greenland’s Project Independence 
Ambitions and Prospects after 300 Years with the Kingdom of Denmark 
Michael Paul 
An important anniversary is coming up in the Kingdom of Denmark: 12 May 2021 
marks exactly three hundred years since the Protestant preacher Hans Egede set sail, 
with the blessing of the Danish monarch, to missionise the island of Greenland. For 
some Greenlanders that date symbolises the end of their autonomy: not a date to 
celebrate but an occasion to declare independence from Denmark, after becoming 
an autonomous territory in 2009. Just as controversial as Egede’s statue in the capital 
Nuuk was US President Donald Trump’s offer to purchase the island from Denmark. 
His arrogance angered Greenlanders, but also unsettled them by exposing the shaky 
foundations of their independence ambitions. In the absence of governmental and 
economic preconditions, leaving the Realm of the Danish Crown would appear to be 
a decidedly long-term option. But an ambitious new prime minister in Nuuk could 
boost the independence process in 2021. 
 
Only one political current in Greenland, 
the populist Partii Naleraq of former Prime 
Minister Hans Enoksen, would like to 
declare independence imminently – on 
National Day (21 June) 2021, the anniver-
sary of the granting of self-government 
within Denmark in 2009. Most of the popu-
lation would prefer to see a more gradual 
process of separation. Greenland does not 
yet appear ready for independence. That 
opinion is shared by Kuupik Kleist, the first 
prime minister from the Inuit Ataqatigiit 
party, who led the territory into self-govern-
ment in 2009. Kleist notes that Denmark 
only wanted to retain control over foreign 
and security policy, and Greenlanders have 
long had the opportunity to take control of 
all internal affairs, from policing and jus-
tice to finances. “In the Law on Self-Govern-
ment the Danes granted us the right to take 
over thirty-two sovereign responsibilities. 
And in ten years we have taken on just one 
of them, oversight over resources.” Many 
people just like to talk about independence, 
he says, but not to work for it. Kleist fears 
that the next generation will remain trapped 
in a mindset of dependency. 
Kim Kielsen, prime minister since 2014, 
underlines the long-term goal of independ-
ence. Significant electoral losses in 2018 
notwithstanding, the governing Siumut 
party’s victory and his re-election were re-
garded as affirmation of the political leader-
ship’s cautious course in the independence 
process. The main reason cited for restraint 
is the island’s financial dependency. Kielsen 
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sees strengthening the economy and fur-
ther reducing its reliance on Denmark as 
the central concern. But on 29 November 
2020 he lost the Siumut (“Forwards”) leader-
ship to Erik Jensen. Jensen intends to cam-
paign more energetically for independence 
and is also likely to replace Kielsen as prime 
minister when parliament reconvenes for 
its first session of 2021. 
Achieving Greenlandic statehood is a 
tricky process. But national borders in the 
Arctic also transect the transnational settle-
ment areas of indigenous populations. The 
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) for exam-
ple represents groups in Alaska, Canada, 
Greenland and Chukotka. Greenland’s 
population is 56,081 (as of 1 January2020), 
almost 90 percent of whom are Inuit. Green-
land’s self-government is thus part of the 
transnational Inuit community, while at 
the same time Greenland is striving to be-
come a state in the traditional sense with 
full formal – and thus also foreign policy – 
sovereignty. The latter is an important 
factor for Nuuk, because enhanced inter-
national status is associated with the ability 
to attract external investment. Copenhagen 
has to tolerate this ambivalent stance, while 
at the same time attempting to influence 
the separation process. Much will therefore 
depend on whether and how the conflicts 
of goals on both sides can be resolved. 
Infrastructure and Foreign Policy 
Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmus-
sen visited Greenland’s capital in person 
in September 2018, to present a financial 
package to expand the airports at Nuuk and 
Ilulissat and otherwise promote the domes-
tic economy. Rasmussen hoped to resolve 
two problems simultaneously, i.e. providing 
Nuuk with the funding required for these 
projects and allaying Washington’s fears 
that excessive Chinese investment could 
leave Greenland overly dependent on Bei-
jing. 
Greenland has no railways, few roads, 
and currently only one international air-
port at which wide-body jets from Asia, 
Europe and North America can dependably 
land, namely Kangerlussuaq. Rather than 
repairing damage to the runway there 
caused by thawing permafrost, Greenland’s 
government plans instead to extend the 
runways at the two regional airports – 
near Nuuk and at the attractive coastal 
tourist destination of Ilulissat – to allow 
international flights to land there from 
2023. Qaqortoq in southern Greenland, 
which like most of the territory’s airstrips 
currently handles only helicopters, is also 
to be turned into a regional airport. 
This unspectacular airport project is a 
highly sensitive matter in several respects: 
domestically as an important step towards 
the economic development required for in-
dependence; externally as a warning sign 
of impending dependency on China; and 
in terms of security as a symbol of defence 
cooperation with the United States. While 
Copenhagen naturally wants to retain 
Greenland in the Danish realm, it must also 
fund the territory’s steps towards independ-
ence. Denying assistance would cost Den-
mark the support of Greenland’s population, 
and ultimately its geopolitical status as an 
Arctic state. The issues are broader than 
simply promoting and developing elements 
of Greenlandic statehood. Denmark needs 
to find ways of dealing with its intractable 
security dilemma: it cannot preserve the 
island’s sovereignty on its own – but ced-
ing effective control to the United States 
would be the end of Denmark as Arctic 
state. The latter appears particularly un-
palatable at a juncture where great power 
rivalry in the region is growing and the 
security situation deteriorating. 
As a major infrastructure project, the 
airport projects fall under the auspices of 
the regional government, which controls 
most aspects of political and economic life 
under the Act on Greenland Self-Govern-
ment of 2009. Copenhagen retains control 
only over foreign and security policy – and 
regarded the project as security-relevant. 
The issue of concern was the China Com-
munications Construction Company (CCCC), 
which appeared on the Greenland Interna-
tional Airports shortlist of possible partners 
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for financing and building the airports. 
CCCC is involved in Belt and Road projects 
through which Beijing seeks to expand its 
global influence. Denmark fears that Chi-
nese engagement could endanger its Green-
land-related defence cooperation with the 
United States. Earlier, in 2016, Copenhagen 
blocked an attempt by the Chinese General 
Nice Group to acquire the former US naval 
base in Grønnedal, following an interven-
tion by Washington. 
The Greenland government sees the air-
ports as a question of infrastructure rather 
than security. Economic diversification and 
investments are vital if they are to achieve 
independence. While Nuuk possesses the 
right to independence under the autonomy 
agreement, it cannot yet afford to exercise 
it. Denmark funds almost half of Green-
land’s public budget, through an annual 
block grant of almost €500 million; that 
would cease in the event of independence. 
There is no prospect of revenues from fish-
ing – which represents about 95 percent of 
Greenland’s exports – and tourism making 
up the shortfall. But resource extraction 
could do so. Greenland’s reserves of rare 
earths, which are vital for a range of high-
tech applications, are sufficient to meet 
current global demand for 150 years. The 
island also possesses metal ores and hydro-
carbon deposits. 
Although external investment is vital 
for independence, Nuuk wishes to avoid 
excessive dependency on foreign firms. A 
government strategy document seeks to 
improve conditions for mining companies 
while maximising socio-economic benefits 
for the population. 
When tourists and investors land at the 
new airports in a few years time, the rev-
enues and capital they bring could help to 
realise independence. But numerous ob-
stacles remain to be overcome. For example 
resource extraction is a responsibility of the 




SWP Comment 10 
January 2021 
4 
is involved there are implications for the 
Kingdom as a whole. Uranium mining and 
Chinese investment raise fundamental ques-
tions over what “security” means in and for 
Denmark, and thus touch on Copenhagen’s 
residual rights. Copenhagen finds itself in 
the tricky position of having to balance and 
stabilise the relationship with its former 
colony – which is already historically bur-
dened and complicated by the independ-
ence issue – in the context of interest-
driven rivalry between great powers. 
Greenland and the 
Sino-American Rivalry 
Nuuk has proactively encouraged a Chinese 
presence in Greenland; like his predecessor 
Aleqa Hammond, Prime Minister Kielsen has 
tried to attract foreign involvement in Green-
land’s mining industry, while other political 
forces expressed reservations over – and in 
the case of uranium mining rejected – 
such investments. In October 2017 he led a 
delegation to Beijing, presumably lobbying 
for investments. 
But Beijing is interested in Greenland 
for both economic and strategic reasons. It 
regards the island as a potential hub in its 
Belt and Road project. A paper by Chinese 
Arctic researchers discussed the prospect 
that the “small and weak Greenland nation” 
could become “the most important link 
for successful realisation of the Polar Silk 
Road”. In this context US Secretary of State 
Mike Pompeo – like Danish Prime Minister 
Rasmussen – pointed to China’s actions in 
the Indo-Pacific region, where governments 
became “ensnared by debt and corruption”. 
But such a strategy is not yet discernible in 
the Arctic. 
Greenland possesses large reserves of 
rare earths. The global market is dominated 
by China, which possesses a market share 
of more than 80 percent and controls practi-
cally the entire supply chain in an “extreme 
example of Western reliance on Chinese 
production”. The United States currently 
imports most of its rare earths from China. 
Global demand for these metals is rising; 
they are required for cutting-edge technol-
ogies such as motors for electric vehicles, 
for high-performance magnets and for net-
worked Industry 4.0 applications. All these 
technologies also have military applications, 
making them crucial for the functioning of 
modern networked armed forces. 
Major rare earth reserves are believed to 
exist in Kringlerne and Kvanefjeld in south-
ern Greenland. The Australian Greenland 
Minerals and Energy (GME), in which the 
Chinese Shenghe Resources holds a stake, 
also intends to mine uranium there. But 
the signing of a cooperation agreement 
between Shenghe and the China National 
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) in 2019 led the 
opposition Inuit Ataqatigiit party to raise 
critical questions concerning the content of 
the agreement, the environmental impact 
and Chinese interests. Currently three suc-
cessive environmental impact assessments 
have rejected rare earth and uranium min-
ing although a majority of Greenland’s par-
liament supports mining. The aforemen-
tioned General Nice Group also holds the 
rights to a mine at Isua in the west, and a 
zinc mine is planned at Citronen Fjord in 
the extreme north, for which the Australian 
firm Ironbark has signed an agreement 
with China Nonferrous Metal. 
The island’s rich resources and strategic 
location have led the United States to make 
formal purchase offers several times, in 1867, 
1946/47 and 1960. So President Trump’s 
idea of buying Greenland and its popula-
tion from Denmark in “a large real estate 
deal” was not entirely new. Alongside its 
major reserves of rare earths, Greenland’s 
strategic significance for the United States 
has been underlined by Russian missile de-
velopments, specifically hypersonic weapons. 
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, 
who took over from Rasmussen in June 
2019, rejected Trump’s proposal as 
“absurd”. Greenland’s Prime Minister 
Kielsen declared that Greenland was not for 
sale, a sentiment echoed on the Twitter 
account of the territory’s foreign ministry: 
“We’re open for business, not for sale.” 
Quite apart from the intricacies of interna-
tional law, under the Act on Greenland 
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Self-Government it would be for Nuuk 
(rather than Copenhagen) to decide whether 
Greenland should become part of the 
United States. Despite her firm rejection, 
Frederiksen assured Washington that 
Denmark would welcome “increased 
strategic cooperation in the Arctic”, which 
can be read as an open admission of secu-
rity dependencies on Washington. 
Greenland and specifically the Thule Air 
Base are indeed exceptionally important 
for the United States. From the geostrategic 
perspective Greenland forms one of North 
America’s extremities; the importance 
of the island’s dominant dimension in the 
Arctic Ocean for Washington has only 
grown as Greenland seeks independence 
and China’s presence expands. Additionally 
almost all Russian reconnaissance flights 
over the North Atlantic pass across or close 
to Greenland, which lies on the shortest 
flight path from Russia’s Western Military 
District to the American East Coast (the same 
applies to missiles). The facilities located at 
Thule include the largest and most northerly 
of America’s ballistic missile early warning 
installations, part of its global satellite con-
trol network and its northernmost deep-sea 
port. Greenland also forms the western end 
of the “GIUK Gap”, the choke point between 
Greenland, Iceland and the northern extrem-
ity of the United Kingdom through which 
ships and submarines of the Russian North-
ern Fleet have to pass to enter the Atlantic. 
Crucial civilian and military maritime infra-
structure (undersea cables) lies south of the 
GIUK Gap and the Labrador Sea. 
In 2017 Greenland’s Foreign and Indus-
try Minister Vittus Qujaukitsoq demanded 
renegotiation of the agreement that grants 
Washington sovereignty over Thule Air 
Base (Pituffik); it was time, he said, for Green-
land to regain its “security autonomy” 
(which it never actually had). In a trilateral 
agreement in October 2020 the United States, 
Denmark and Greenland declared that the 
security and prosperity of all three parties 
will continue to depend on strong transat-
lantic cooperation, for which the Thule 
base is of central importance. As well as 
economic benefits (the base is to be main-
tained by local firms from 2024), the agree-
ment is of great value to Nuuk because it 
treats Greenland as a foreign policy actor. 
In 2020 Washington opened a diplomatic 
representation in Nuuk after a hiatus of al-
most seven decades, and offered a financial 
package worth US$12.1 million to develop 
Greenland’s resources, tourism and educa-
tion (although most of the money is ear-
marked for American consultancy services). 
The US offers met with little support 
and tended to be regarded as an attempt 
to undermine Danish-Greenland relations 
rather than a genuine offer of support. 
Trump’s offer to buy Greenland ultimately 
spurred the Danish parliament to think 
about creating a better future for Greenland 
within the Danish realm. 
Lost Homeland or Treasure Island? 
Ambivalent Consequences of 
Climate Change 
The loss of the polar sea ice has multiple glo-
bal impacts of its own. Even more dramatic 
will be the consequences of the melting of 
the ice sheet that covers about 80 percent of 
Greenland’s land surface; more than three 
kilometres thick in places, it represents one 
of the world’s largest reservoirs of fresh 
water. Between 2002 and 2016 Greenland 
lost ice at an average rate of about 280 bil-
lion tonnes/year, and the speed of loss 
has quadrupled since then. Greenland’s ice 
sheet is currently the largest single contribu-
tor to the global rise in sea level. A further 
acceleration was reported in 2020. 
A survey in August 2019 found that about 
92 percent of Greenlanders believe that 
climate change is real, and 76 percent said 
they noticed the effects in their everyday 
life. Three out of four families said they 
lived from hunting, and more than half 
feared that climate change would harm their 
livelihood; almost half thought fishing 
would also be affected. Some Inuit feel fear 
and sadness when confronted – sometimes 
daily – with the habitat losses. In that sense, 
the environmental harm has triggered a cul-
tural catastrophe: The preservation and 
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long-term protection of the living resources 
on which life in the Arctic has always 
depended lies at the heart of Inuit culture. 
It is paradoxical that some fear and 
others even welcome the effects of global 
warming: “The faster the glaciers melt, the 
more attention our country gets”, said for-
mer industry minister Jens-Erik Kirkegaard, 
declaring the island a beneficiary of en-
vironmental change. Climate change, he 
says, is like free advertising because it is 
getting easier to attract capital. Halibut and 
cod mature more quickly in the warming 
waters, and the grass-growing season in the 
south of the island is longer, reducing the 
need to import sheep feed. Global warming 
is causing change already, even if it is likely 
to be decades before Greenland becomes 
the “green land” the Vikings dreamt of. 
Alternatively, a “green growth” strategy 
could develop environmentally sustainable 
economic sectors. Greenland’s Industry and 
Energy Minister Jess Svane (since May 2020 
Minister for the Labour Market, Research 
and Environment) announced plans to turn 
meltwater from the ice sheet into drinking 
water for export. The power of the melt-
water could also be harnessed to generate 
clean electricity for energy-intensive com-
puting centres. The Arctic climate makes 
the High North as a whole an ideal location 
for innovative technologies and services, 
as the European Commission recognised 
in 2016: “Harsh climatic conditions and 
the fragile environment require specialised 
technology and know-how to meet high 
environmental standards. Opportunities in 
the ‘Green Economy’, such as sustainable 
multi-source energy systems, eco-tourism 
and low-emission food production, could 
be developed further.” The Commission 
wants to support the search for sustainable 
economic alternatives, naming explicitly 
“‘Blue Economy’ sectors such as aquacul-
ture, fisheries, offshore renewable energy, 
maritime tourism and marine biotechnol-
ogy”. Energy can be a growth sector in 
Greenland (as in Iceland); the availability 
of geothermal and hydro power back up 
that expectation. 
Cruise ship visits are also expected to con-
tribute to growth, but must exhibit “the 
utmost consideration for the fragile, natu-
ral environment, local cultures and cultural 
remains”, as the Association of Arctic Ex-
pedition Cruise Operators (AECO) puts it. 
On the other hand Greenland can probably 
thank its small visitor numbers for its cur-
rently relatively low incidence of Covid-19. 
Finance Minister Qujaukitsoq wishes 
to see investment and tourism promoting 
Greenland’s development regardless where 
the funds come from: China, the United 
States or Canada. The important thing, he 
says, is better training and more jobs. Ulti-
mately, he adds, an independent Greenland 
will remain a member of NATO and not – 
like Djibouti in Africa – host military bases 
for rival powers like China. 
Rights for Greenland and Security 
for the Whole Kingdom 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands still belong 
to Denmark. But both already enjoy exten-
sive self-administration and remain by their 
own choice outside the EU. While they are 
not entitled to pursue absolutely autono-
mous foreign and security policies, they can 
maintain their own international contacts 
providing these do not contradict the offi-
cial Danish line. Erik Jensen, new leader of 
Siumut and probably the next prime minis-
ter from 2021, intends to plough more en-
ergy into independence than his predeces-
sor Kielsen. He also plans to take more re-
sponsibilities from Copenhagen; concretely 
that means veterinary controls, immigra-
tion, shipping and greater responsibility for 
foreign policy. 
As a sovereign state Greenland could 
still continue cooperation with Denmark in 
questions of defence and foreign policy, as 
well as financial policy. Copenhagen would 
have an interest in that, because Greenland 
is the key to Denmark’s access to the Arctic 
with all its resources and attributes: miner-
als, fishing grounds, oil and gas, power and 
international recognition. In order to main-
tain the status associated with this, Copen-
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hagen will have to invest more in protect-
ing and defending its rights. 
As the Arctic polar sea ice melts shipping 
traffic has been increasing. Since 2006 there 
has also been a growing number of vessels 
entering Danish-controlled waters without 
observing the usual protocols. In August 
2017 the Chinese ice-breaker Xue Long (Snow 
Dragon) appeared unannounced off the capi-
tal Nuuk. Cases of piracy, illegal fishing or 
terrorism have not yet come to light. But 
how should maritime security be ensured 
as shipping traffic increases? 
The Royal Danish Navy possesses three 
ice-breakers and serves as Greenland’s coast-
guard. The forces in Greenland currently 
operate one aircraft, four helicopters and 
four ships (as well as the legendary Sirius 
Dog Sled Patrol) – to guard the world’s 
largest island with 44,000 kilometres of 
coastline. With these personnel and re-
sources, they also have to defend the sover-
eignty of the realm, monitor fisheries, pro-
vide maritime services, transport patients 
and assist with other social services, and 
conduct search and rescue (SAR) missions. 
The SAR deficits in the Arctic are consider-
able. What had been less well known until 
recently was how weak the land, air and sea 
reconnaissance capabilities are, despite the 
US base in Thule. “Things start to get pretty 
dark once you get up higher than 72 de-
grees north,” said former U.S. Coast Guard 
Commandant Admiral Paul Zukunft. A 
patrol had “stumbled upon a joint exercise 
between Russia and China”, of which the 
intelligence services had remained unaware 
on account of the lack of satellite surveil-
lance. A proposal to resume the “Greenland 
Patrol” established by the US Coastguard in 
1941, made in a blog of the U.S. Naval Insti-
tute, is certainly justifiable. Future US aid, 
the author recommends, should be ear-
marked for port infrastructure to enable 
them to receive US Coast Guard (USCG) 
vessels if the need arises. 
Copenhagen intends to increase its mili-
tary spending in Greenland, beginning with 
1.5 billion Danish crowns for maritime 
surveillance in 2019. Possessing no satellites 
of its own, Denmark uses the services of the 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). 
While EMSA data allows identification of 
oil spills for example, it cannot locate a sur-
face vessel or submarine determined to con-
ceal its presence. 
Growing Russian military activity in the 
region has led a number of states to demon-
stratively expand their presence in support 
of the Nordic NATO members. In August 
2020, the USS Thomas Hudner became the 
first Arleigh Burke class destroyer to enter 
the deep fjord behind Nuuk; in the same 
month Danish and French warships con-
ducted joint exercises with a USCG vessel 
off Greenland’s west coast. In September 
Denmark conducted joint manoeuvres in 
the Barents Sea with the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Norway. In the first 
such operation for twenty years, naval 
forces demonstrated freedom of navigation 
above the Arctic Circle. On 1 October 2020 
an operational coordination arrangement 
came into effect between NATO’s Maritime 
Command (MARCOM) and the Danish Joint 
Arctic Command (JACO) in Greenland; its 
purposes include exchanging situation 
reports and enhancing cooperation. JACO 
was founded in October 2012. It functions 
as the connection point between the Danish 
armed forces and the Greenland authori-
ties; its headquarters is in Nuuk. 
Denmark has to pursue a delicate balance 
between its own scarce military resources 
and the comprehensive support offered by 
its allies. An independent Greenland will 
not be able to defend itself on its own. Co-
penhagen relies on support from Washing-
ton but has to avoid any appearance that 
it is allowing its policies to be dictated by 
Washington. Trump’s offer exacerbated 
that problem because his idea is a “abso-
lutely radical break” with the post-1945 
status quo. “When small nations wake up 
to the world’s superpower threatening to 
unroot that relation, it’s not something 
to take lightly,” the Danish expert Martin 
Breum explained. 




Greenland will remain in some form of 
union with Denmark for the foreseeable 
future. One reason for Copenhagen to sup-
port granting Asian states observer status in 
the Arctic Council was to make it easier to 
find investors for Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands. That in turn improves its relation-
ship with the two autonomous territories 
and weakens the centrifugal forces. These 
intentions are subsidiary to Denmark’s cen-
tral foreign policy objective: avoiding harm 
to its relationships with the United States 
and with the European Union, and to its 
own privileged position in the Arctic. The 
new trilateral agreement for the US base 
in Thule is suited to further these interests. 
Additionally to the ambitions of the 
“near-Arctic state” China and established 
Arctic power Russia, Denmark’s problems 
ultimately include the associated reawaken-
ing of US interest in Greenland. Copenhagen 
has to balance conflicting internal interests 
and – for all its understanding of the 
desire for independence of its territories – 
safeguard its own foreign policy and secu-
rity interests. Trump’s initiative increased 
the price of continuing security coopera-
tion. But the success of the Thule Agree-
ment indicates the possibility that an inde-
pendent Greenland could continue defence 
cooperation with the United States without 
that country (or Canada) necessarily sup-
planting Denmark as protector. 
Nuuk (and Torshavn) are in the comfort-
able situation of being courted from mul-
tiple quarters. Erik Jensen, the likely next 
prime minister of Greenland, also wants to 
promote independence by trading with all 
nations, including both the United States 
and China. Denmark will seek to control 
the centrifugal forces, allowing Nuuk to 
become more independent while remaining 
part of the Danish realm. Copenhagen knows 
it depends on Greenland for its seat on the 
Arctic Council, and the associated interest 
of the major powers. Further progress to-
wards independence would therefore have 
significant repercussions for Denmark’s 
foreign and security policy. But the decision 
will ultimately be made in Nuuk. 
Dr. Michael Paul is Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division at SWP. 
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